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Abstract: Risky driving behavior is regarded as being one of the best 
predictors of traffic accidents. Traffic violations certainly signal risky 
driving behavior, but the analysis of the linkage of traffic violations, 
individual and vehicle characteristics and annual mileage has so far been 
hampered by the difficulty of gaining access to appropriate disaggregate 
data. The contribution of this paper is that it sets out and explores a rich 
data set in order to study traffic violations, including both accident-
involved and accident-free individuals. The data set comprises all insurance 
policies from Sweden’s largest automobile insurance company covering 
several years, in total 9.3 million observations, as well as information on 
fines and convictions for traffic violations. This implies that the methodo-
logical issues associated with self-reported violations and only accident-
involved individuals are disused.  The first purpose is to establish the role 
of age and gender in traffic violations. The second purpose is to make a 
first attempt to establish whether vehicle owners of status brands are more 
likely to commit traffic violations. The results support previous findings as 
well as confirm the association between owners of status brands and traffic 
violations. The main conclusion is that insurance data provides a viable 
option when studying behavior, but it also raises new methodological is-
sues. 

Introduction 
Traffic accidents are among the largest health care problems worldwide 
causing the deaths of approximately 1.2 million people annually (Peden et 
al.; 2004). Predictions show that by 2020 road traffic injuries will have 
become the third leading contributor to the global burden of disease and 
injury (Wallén-Warner and Sandin; 2010). Risky behavior, such as 
violations of driving regulations, is one of the best predictors of accident 
risk (Parker et al.; 1995, Forward; 2006, 2008).Traffic violations also in-
crease the probability of the vehicle owner reporting an at-fault accident to 
the insurance company (Arvidsson; 2010). It is therefore policy relevant to 
establish the characteristics that are associated with risky driving behavior.  
 
There is a huge literature addressing this issue, much of it using survey data 
on self-reported accidents and traffic violations or data on individuals 
involved in accidents; moreover, the data analysis is often based on small 
samples. The drawback of only using accident-involved individuals is that 
it obstructs inference since we lack information on traffic violations of the 
population at large, that is, accident-free individuals. The disadvantage of 
self-reported violations and accidents is that individuals – consciously or 
unconsciously – under-report accident history and traffic violations.  
 
The contribution of this study is that we set out and explore richer data 
than used by previous literature. The data consists of approximately 9.3 
million observations of insurance policies containing characteristics of the 
vehicle owner and the vehicle, as well as annual mileage. In addition to 
insurance data we have added register data on traffic violations of 
individuals who reported an accident and individuals that did not. Due to 
restricted availability of these kinds of data our dataset provides, to the 
best of our knowledge, a unique opportunity to study traffic violations. 
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The first purpose of this paper is to study the relation between traffic 
violations, age and gender. More observations and access to a 
comprehensive set of insurance buyers will give us the opportunity to 
establish the relationship between age, gender and traffic violations. A 
second purpose is to include more explanatory variables such as 
characteristics of the vehicle (brand and age) and annual mileage. The 
intention is to establish a first step towards a common understanding of 
the fact that certain vehicle brands are associated with risk-taking 
behavior. We test the hypothesis that owners of status brands are more 
likely to commit traffic violations compared to owners of family-related 
brands. We define three vehicle brands as being more family orientated 
(Volvo, Saab and Volkswagen) and three as being associated with higher 
status (BMW, Porsche and Lamborghini).  
 
We divide the analysis in to two steps since there tend to be methodologi-
cal issues with the use of explanatory variables that are not exogenously 
given in the model (Angrist and Pischke; 2010). While age and gender are 
exogenously given in our model, vehicle characteristics and annual mileage 
are more or less endogenous; the choice of vehicle and how much you drive 
may increase the probability of receiving an on-the-spot-fine or conviction 
for a violation. The police may further be biased and stop certain vehicles 
that are often associated with traffic violations, such as fast sport vehicles 
or vehicles driven by young individuals. In the latter case age and gender 
may be endogenous as well. How to resolve these methodological issues is 
beyond the scope of this paper and we settle for separating the analysis 
into two steps. We believe that the nature of this data makes it possible to 
learn more about what increases the probability of a traffic violation and 
that it provide a good source for future research. We emphasize the fact 
that the use of insurer data also raises new methodological issues. All in all, 
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this study provides a first methodological step to study violations with a 
data source other than previously used. 
 
Our results from the first part of the analysis are consistent with previous 
findings in that males are more likely to commit traffic violations com-
pared to females. For both genders the probability of having convictions 
increases up to middle-age, while older vehicle owners are less likely to 
have convictions. Speeding follows a similar pattern; the probability of 
getting a speeding ticket increases with age until the 30s, while older vehi-
cle owners are less likely to get speeding tickets. The probability of fines 
for traffic offences other than speeding decreases with age, suggesting that 
younger drivers are more inclined to take risks. Since fines for other traffic 
offences can be vehicle-related, another explanation is that younger indi-
viduals, due to some budget restrictions, own older vehicles, which are 
more likely to have flaws than newer vehicles. If young individuals are 
more likely to own “bad quality” vehicles, they are also more likely to be 
fined for vehicle flaws. 
 
The second part of the analysis suggests that owners of status vehicles are 
more likely to be fined, especially for speeding, while owners of family 
orientated cars are less likely to be fined. The results regarding convictions 
for traffic safety violations are more ambiguous. Only BMW-owners are 
more likely to get at least one conviction. The difference between fines and 
convictions may thus be explained by the fact that they represent different 
social and financial costs.  
 
Our findings also suggest that the probability of getting speeding tickets 
increases if annual mileage increases, while traffic violations and convic-
tions are more likely for individuals with lower annual mileage. This im-
plies that the majority of drivers with fines and convictions for traffic vio-
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lations drive in the lower kilometer classes. Owners of older vehicles are 
more likely to be fined and convicted for traffic offences, but less likely get 
speeding tickets. Violations further increase the probability of reporting an 
at-fault claim, which is consistent with previous findings.  
 
Our main conclusion is that insurance data is a viable source for analyzing 
accident risk, the primary reason being that it consists of many observa-
tions and contains detailed information. Besides, it enables us to combine 
accident analysis with economic predictions, since it contains information 
on payments (premium) and loss indemnity (costs), which provide us with 
the possibility of making economic inferences for future research. 
 
The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 provides an over-
view of related accident literature. Section 3 describes the empirical frame-
work including predictions, econometric approach, data and descriptive 
statistics. Section 4 presents the results, while section 5 concludes the pa-
per. 
 
2. Related Literature 
Several studies emphasize the importance of driving behavior for accidents; 
Rumar (1985), using British and American crash reports, indicates that 57 
percent of crashes were due to driver factors, 27 percent to combined 
roadway and driver factors and 6 percent to combined vehicle and driver 
factors. The remaining 11 percent were due to other combinations of these 
factors. Furthermore, Lum and Reagan (1995) report that British and 
American crash data reveals that 93 percent of the road crashes may be 
attributed to driver errors, drunk driving and other human factors. Age 
generally correlates negatively with aggressive driving. Relative to older 
drivers, younger drivers have higher violation rates and underestimate the 
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risk of various violations (Groeger and Brown; 1989). Besides, they also 
have a lower motivation to comply with traffic laws (Yagil; 1998). This 
implies that driving characteristics are an important accident predictor.  
 
Risky behavior, such as violations of existing driving regulations, is one of 
the best predictors of accident risk (Boyer et al.; 1991 and Stradling et al.; 
2000). Individuals with violations are also more likely to report an 
accident at fault to the insurance company (Arvidsson; 2010). Erlier, Ross 
(1960) discussed this topic and argued that traffic law violations were a 
folk crime. Among violations, speeding is well established in the traffic 
safety literature (Aarts and van Schagen; 2006, Nilsson; 2004). Speeding is 
associated with higher accident risk and often pointed out as the most 
frequent violation (Nallet et al; 2010). This implies that the perceived risk 
of speeding tends to be low: even though the risk is evident at an aggregate 
level, individuals rarely experience the consequences of speeding. Rather, 
the perceived time gain is larger than the risk increase from speeding. 
Traffic-psychologists also stress the importance of social norms when 
engaging in risky behavior such as speeding. In Sweden, as in several other 
countries, speeding is more acceptable compared to, for instance, drunken 
driving (See Forward; 2008 and Åberg; 1993 for a review).  
 
Previous research has furthermore established demographic differences in 
risk and why drivers commit violations. In general, women and older 
drivers tend to commit violations less frequently compared to men and 
young drivers. On the other hand women and older drivers seem to make 
more errors compared to men and young drivers (Åberg and Rimmö; 
1998, Bener et al; 2008). According to psychologists these behavioral 
differences are due to that men being more inclined to be sensation seekers 
and undertake unsafe driving actions, such as speeding and driving while 
intoxicated (Jonah; 1997). Moreover, violations are often attributed to 
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psychological factors such as overestimation of skills (Weinstein; 1999, 
Walton; 1999). One reason may be that drivers rate themselves to be better 
than the average driver (McKenna et al.; 1991). One example is that 90 
percent of the automobile drivers in Sweden consider themselves as above 
average (Svenson; 1981). Numerous studies on road safety have found that 
people think their driving abilities are better, or that their vulnerability to 
road accidents is lower than for other drivers. This lowers the likelihood of 
adopting safe behavior and undermines the efficiency of educational efforts 
(Delhomme et al.; 2009).  
 
Annual mileage is another important accident predictor (Peck and Kuan; 
1983, Massie et al.; 1997) related to traffic violations. Being regarded as a 
high risk increases with annual mileage (exposure), which implies that it is 
important to control for annual mileage when studying differences in 
gender, for instance. The reason is that males generally drive more than 
females. Previous literature has shown that, when considering risk per mile 
driven, high-mileage drivers have a lower accident risk per mile, compared 
to low-mileage drivers (Maycock; 1985; Janke; 1991). Driven distance, 
however, calls for a remark since distance traveled can have an ambiguous 
effect on accident risk; increasing distance traveled per year increases 
exposure, which increases the accident probability, but also increases 
driving experience, which reduces the accident risk.  
 
Benfield et al (2006) use several measures for driver and vehicle and the 
results suggest that these driver and vehicle measures are correlated with 
several indexes of aggressive driving tendencies. In some cases the vehicle 
measures used predicted aggressive driving better than the driver 
personality measures, suggesting that vehicle attributes may generate a 
selection of individuals with risk-taking behavior, which possibly implies 
that certain vehicles are associated with risky behavior.  
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3. The empirical framework 
As mentioned in the introduction, there are methodological issues associ-
ated with endogenous variables that obstruct inference of the causal effect. 
We therefore divide the analysis into two separate steps. In the first part we 
establish the role of age and gender in traffic violations. In the second part 
we include more explanatory variables to study the interrelationship of 
traffic violations, annual mileage and vehicle characteristics. Compared to 
age and gender, which are exogenous to the model, the variables in the 
second step are more or less endogenous since they are dependent on the 
individuals’ choices. Nonetheless, age and gender may be discriminating 
factors when stopped by the police. This implies that young individuals 
and males in particular may be stopped and fined more often compared to 
other groups. If this is the case, age and gender will tend to be endogenous 
as well.  
 
We separate fines and convictions, since we expect that there may be dif-
ferences in observed violations. The reason is that fines and convictions 
represent different degrees of sanctions, different levels of social acceptabil-
ity and different costs. The financial loss associated with a speeding ticket 
is lower and the social acceptability is higher, compared to a conviction 
that may be associated with heavy fines or prison and lower acceptance 
levels.  
 
 
3.1 Econometrical approach 
A. Part I: establishing the effect of age and gender 
We start the analysis by testing the relation between traffic violations and 
the age and gender of the vehicle owner. We expect that young individuals 
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are riskier and that women are less likely to commit violations compared 
to males.  
 
Prob(Speeding ticket(s)=1)= Φ (1gender+2age+3(age)2+4age·gender)=Φ(.)1    (1) 
 
Prob(Traffic offence(s)=1)=Φ(1gender+2age+3(age)2+4age·gender)= Φ(.)2      (2) 
Prob(Convictions(s)=1)=Φ(1gender+2age+3(age)2+4age·gender)= Φ(.)3        (3)
 
The dependent variable of equations (1) – (3) takes the value one if the 
individual has at least one-on-the-spot fine for traffic offences, at least one 
on-the-spot-fine for speeding and at least one conviction for traffic safety 
violations respectively. If not the dependent variable is zero. Explanatory 
variables are the age and gender of the vehicle owner. We furthermore 
include age squared and an interaction term between age and gender. The 
results are presented in Table 4 below. 
 
 
B. Part II: Including endogenous variables 
In the second step we provide a first step to empirically investigate the 
statement that high risk individuals are associated with status cars and that 
the more family orientated cars are less likely to be associated with high 
risk. According to Statistics Sweden, more luxurious cars such as Jeep, 
Mercedes and Porsche tend to have disproportionately many parking 
tickets. A possible explanation is that it is relatively less costly for owners 
of expensive vehicles to pay a parking fine than to search for a parking lot. 
Furthermore, more family orientated vehicles, such as some Toyota 
models, are not among the top fined vehicles, even though they are 
expensive. This possibly suggests that the vehicle may represent more than 
just a means of transport. That is, the choice of vehicle reflects the owners 
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self-image in terms of own status concerns, as well as status concerns of 
others.  
 
We use Volvo, Saab and Volkswagen as proxies for family orientated vehi-
cles, as these are among the ten most common vehicles in Sweden (Statis-
tics Sweden, 2008). We moreover define BMW, Porsche and Lamborghini 
to be vehicle brands associated with higher status. We do not distinguish 
between vehicle models, cc and capacity, which implies that our definition 
of status and family cars is a rather broad generalization.1  
 
Prob(Speeding ticket(s)=1)= Φ(1X+ 2B)  (4) 
Prob(Traffic offence(s)=1)= Φ(1X+ 2B)  (5) 
Prob(Conviction(s)=1)= Φ(1X+ 2B)  (6) 
      
The vector X includes age and gender of the vehicle owner, vehicle age and 
annual mileage. The vector B consists of dummy variables that take the 
value one if the individual owns a Volvo, Saab, Volkswagen, BMW, Por-
sche or Lamborghini. The brand indicator variable takes the value zero for 
all other brands in the data. The results are shown in Tables 6-9 below. 
 
 
3.2 Data 
Each observation includes the insurers’ information about the individual, 
vehicle and contract characteristics.2 The data set comes from an automo-
bile insurance provider with 24 regional subsidiaries located in all Swedish 
counties. Data covers three years (2006-2008) and is not censored, which 
                                                     
1 Considering different vehicle and year models would likely provide small, or even 
empty data cells. 
2 Appendix A provides a detailed list of the information included in each observa-
tion. 
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implies that we observe contracts that expire in 2006 at least from their 
starting date.  
 
Data on on-the-spot fines comes from the RIOB register of the Swedish 
National Police Board (RPS). Fines are divided into speeding and other 
traffic offences such as running red lights, overtaking at crossings, and 
other offences due to risky behavior or vehicle flaws. Data on the number 
of convictions for traffic safety violations is registered by the Swedish Na-
tional Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ). Convictions are sanctions car-
ried out by an attorney, and example including convictions for driving 
while intoxicated or driving carelessly.  
 
Data in respect of on-the-spot fines and convictions has been merged with 
the insurance and claim files by BRÅ and we have also merged the insur-
ance file, the risk classification file and claim files and cleaned the data.  
 
 
3.3 Pros and cons of using insurance data 
All in all, the majority of previous studies are based on survey data of self 
reported violations, crash data, or before and after studies of road crashes 
associated with change in speed limits, for instance. The number of obser-
vations range from hundreds to, in some cases, hundreds of thousands. 
Despite the number of observations the robustness of the estimates may be 
insufficient, the reason being that accident data does not include accident-
free drivers and that survey data suffers from measurement problems. A 
convenient option is therefore insurance data that contains driver and vehi-
cle characteristics, annual mileage and driver behavior of both accident-
involved and accident-free individuals. Another benefit is that it also comes 
in large data sets. Obviously all traffic violations do not result in fines or 
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convictions, but the data is likely to capture repeat offenders since the 
probability of being observed and fined, or convicted, increases with 
frequencies of violations. Since the data is obtained from insurance 
policies, uninsured drivers are not included. The number of uninsured 
vehicle owners in Sweden is low: approximately one percent of vehicle 
owners are uninsured, according to the Swedish motor insurers. 
 
In addition the current data contains information about the vehicle owner’s 
habitual driving style (traffic violations). Due to the nature of the data we 
do not have the problems associated with self reports, or a selection of 
accident-involved drivers only, since individuals themselves reveal their 
type. In total there are 565 836 females and 930 573 males in the data, 
which sum up to about 1.5 million individuals (policyholders or vehicle 
owners). Furthermore, there are approximately 2.4 million contract-ids 
and when including a contract-id with a new time period, which is a re-
peated contract, we have approximately 9.3 million observations of poli-
cyholders and their contracts.  
 
The complexity of insurance data calls for a remark. First of all it consists 
of four dimensions; individual-id, contract-id, vehicle-id and time period. 
This implies that it is problematic to treat data as a panel for two reasons: 
first an individual may own several vehicles (vehicle-id), and several vehi-
cles owned by the same individual can have the same or different contract-
ids. Generally all vehicles should have their own contract id, even if they 
are owned by the same individual. This implies that it is problematic to 
create a panel-id that is consistent. Second, even if a unique panel-id was to 
be created in a consistent matter, it would most likely appear more than 
once during the same time period, which generally is not allowed within a 
panel. Duplicate observations may result if two or more accidents occur 
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during the same time period, but these should not be interpreted as dupli-
cate observations since they are separate accidents.  
 
The number of observations of an individual further depends on how many 
periods the individual has been a client of the insurer, how many vehicles 
he or she owns and how many changes are made to the contract.  Exam-
ples of contract changes include; changing deductible, moving, registering 
or de-registering the vehicle. This is equivalent to a change in risk that 
requires an updated contract. For every change that is made the contract 
receive a new time period (a repeated contract) and appears as a new ob-
servation.  Hence, if an individual owns several vehicles and makes several 
changes in the contracts, he or she will appear in as many observations, see 
Table 1.  
 
Finding an econometric approach best first the data is beyond the scope of 
this paper. We do, however, consider the dependency between observations 
of the same individuals by using a probit model with cluster robust stan-
dard errors with respect to individual-id. This implies that we allow for 
dependency between observations of the same individual, while observa-
tions between different individuals are treated as independent. In this way 
we also allow for dependency between contracts that are owned by the 
same individual.  
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Table 1. Number of observations per individual over 18 years old. 
 
Number of 
observations 
per individual 
Females Males 
 Percent Frequency Percent Frequency 
1 17.64 565 704 15.33 930 151 
5 10.9 349 473 9.95 603 766 
10 1.84 59 102 2.75 167 065 
15- 1.23 51 626 4.93 299 085 
Number of 
observations: 
3 206 627 
(34.58%) 
 6 066 651 
(65.43%) 
 
Total number of observations: 9 273 278 
 
 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of self-reported number of kilometers 
driven per year. There are reasons to believe that some policyholders' un-
der-report the actual number of kilometer driven per year since this lowers 
the premium. We note this as a potential caveat with these data. Number 
of kilometers is divided into five risk classes, where 1 is the lowest and 5 
the highest exposure. The table illustrates that the majority of contracts are 
in the two lowest distance classes. A higher share of females report that 
they drive in the lowest kilometer class, while a higher share of males re-
port that they drive in the higher kilometer classes. 
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Table 2. Stated number of kilometers driven per year 
Kilometer class 1-5 Females Males Total 
1 = 0-10 000 km 56.35 49.88 52.12 
2 = 10 001-15 000 km 30.48 32.89 32.06 
3 = 150 001-20 000 km  9.07 11.42 10.61 
4 = 20 001-25 000 km 2.34 3.09 2.83 
5 = 25 001 km - … 1.76 2.72 2.39 
Number of observations   9 273 278 
Notes: 1 mile= 1.6 kilometer.  
 
Table 3 illustrates that females have a lower share of fines and convictions 
compared to males. According to previous findings a higher share of males 
is involved in fatal accidents compared to women, while woman have 
higher rates of involvement in injury and police reported crashes (Massie et 
al.). Table 3 also shows that women have a higher share of claims com-
pared to males, which is consistent with previous findings since smaller 
accidents are more common than fatal accidents. It should be noted, how-
ever, that a higher share of females have All Risk Insurance (full coverage) 
compared to males. The reason is that higher coverage is likely to increase 
the incentives to report a claim.  
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Table 3. On the spot fines, convictions, accidents and coverage for females 
and males respectively. 
 Females Males 
Speeding ticket(s) 6.77 14.97
Traffic offence(s) 3.22 9.81
Conviction(s) 3.74 14.88
Accidents (claims) 6.47 6.16
Accidents at fault (claims) 1.00 0.93
All Risk Insurance 60.62 54.58
Number of observations 3 206 627 6 066 651
  
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics of traffic safety violations and vehicle 
brand for females and males respectively. Again females have a lower share 
of violations compared to males. The table further illustrates that owners 
of family cars have a lower share of fines and convictions compared to 
owners of status vehicles, which is true for both genders. This may be an 
indication that owners of status vehicles are slightly more inclined to take 
risks compared to owners of more family orientated cars. As we can see the 
average year of birth is about the same for owners of status and family 
brands. This implies that the higher share of observed traffic safety viola-
tions is probably not related to age.3  
 
                                                     
3 The probability of being observed as a certain type increases with age. If the 
status vehicle owners had a lower average year of birth, their age could be one 
explanation of the higher share of observed traffic safety violations. 
Table 4. Traffic safety violations and vehicle brand (%). 
 Speeding ticket(s) Traffic Offence(s) Convictions(s) Average year of 
birth 
Number of observa-
tions 
 Females Males Females Males Females Males Females Males Females Males 
Family brands    
Volvo 7.10 14.23 3.32 9.76 4.06 15.62 1958 1956 436 247 1 176 934
Saab 6.84 14.27 2.82 7.84 3.34 12.2 1957 1956 238 100 613 940
Volkswagen 6.66 15.11 3.05 9.66 3.26 13.57 1956 1957 445 150 655 421
Status brands    
BMW 9.56 21.93 4.84 14.69 3.84 17.86 1958 1960 82 018 240 803
Lamborghini 44.44 50.00 0 29.47 0 25.79 1954 1964 9 190
Porsche 12.43 28.66 4.74 14.95 5.24 16.88 1958 1960 3 419 23 645
Notes: On-the-spot fines for speeding and other traffic offences and convictions are tabulated for the respec-
tive vehicle brands. Average year of birth of the vehicle owner is summarized in the second last column, 
while the total number of observations is in the last column.
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 4. Results 
4.1 Traffic violations, age and gender 
Table 5 contains the results of a probit estimation of equations (1) to (3), 
where dependent variables represent different traffic violations.  From col-
umn A-C in Table 5 it is possible to calculate the marginal effects of age 
and gender, which are reported in Table 6. 
 
 
Table 5. Traffic violations, age and gender. 
 A: Speeding 
ticket(s) 
B: Traffic offence(s) C: Conviction(s) 
Females -0.0832*** 
(0.0021) 
-0.0874***  
(0.0014) 
-0.1946*** 
(0.0020) 
Age  0.0047*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0018***  
 (0.0000) 
 0.0096*** 
(0.0001) 
(Age)2 -0.0001*** 
(1.28e-06) 
-4.37e-06*** 
(9.52e-07) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
Age·Gender 0.0000402 
(0.0001) 
 0.0007*** 
(0.0000) 
 0.0023*** 
(0.0001) 
Wald 2  32243.81 30624.74 35908.85 
Log pseudolike-
lihood 
-3264267 -2320085.7 -3013996.7 
Prob> 2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 9 273 278 9 273 278 9 273 278 
Notes: The dependent variable takes the value one if the individual has at 
least one speeding ticket, at least one fine for traffic offences or at least one 
conviction for traffic safety violations. The dependent variables are gender, 
age, (age)2 and (age*gender). Cluster robust standard errors are in paren-
theses. ***, **, * represent 1, 5 and 10 percent significance level respec-
tively. See main text for more details.  
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Speeding increases for younger groups, up to the early 30s, and decreases 
when the individual becomes older, for both genders.4 Males are more 
likely to get speeding tickets compared to females. Fines for other traffic 
offences are less likely the older an individual is, and males are more likely 
to be fined for other traffic offences compared to females.5 This suggests 
that younger individuals and males are riskier compared to older individu-
als and females. Younger individuals are more likely to have convictions 
compared to older individuals and males are more likely to have convic-
tions than females. 6 More precisely, the probability of convictions in-
creases up to age 46.5 for males and age 57.5 for females and decreases for 
older vehicle owners7. Females below the age of 86 have fewer convictions 
compared to males, for females over 86 the relation is the reverse, indicat-
ing that females have more convictions compared to males.8 
 
 
                                                     
4-β2/2β3= -0.00470612/2(-0.0000747) = 31.5 is the break-even age for males and -
β3=-0.0018414/2(-0.00000437)= 210.69 is the break-even age for males. (β2+ 
(β2+ β4)/2β3=-(0.00470612+0.0000402)/2(-0.0000747) = 31.77 is the break-even 
age for females (Marginal probit estimates from equation (1) in column A in Table 
5). 
5β2/2
β4)/2β3=(-0.0018414+0.0006894)/2(-0.00000437)= 131.8  is the break-even age 
for females. Marginal probit estimates from equation (2) are in column B in Table 
5. 
6 Note of caution:  there is a difference between fines and convictions since fines are 
available from 2004-2007 while convictions are available from 1973-2007. This 
implies that the probability of having a conviction is more likely to increase with 
age compared to fines. The fact that the probability of having conviction decreases 
with age may partially be due to the fact that data on convictions is accessible from 
1973: with the result that individuals aged 50 and over may not have convictions 
from their youth included in the data. Note that an individual aged 60 in year 2006 
was aged 27 in 1973, which is the first year of our register data of convictions. 
From hereon this is not commented on further. 
7-β2/2β3=-0.0096234/2(-0.0001034)= 46.53 is the break-even age for males and -
(β2+ β4)/2β3=-(0.0096234+0.0022697)/2(-0.0001034)= 57.51 is the break-even age 
for females (Marginal probit estimates from equation (3) in column C in Table 5).  
8 -β1/β4 =-(-0.1946331)/0.0022697=85.75 (Marginal probit estimates from eq (3), 
Column C in Table 5). 
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Table 6 The margi the int
 A Speeding raffic offen- C: Convictions 
nal effects of eraction terms 
B: T
ces 
The marginal ge  effect of a
Males 20  0.0017 -0.0020 0.0055 
Males 50 -0.0028 -0.0023 -0.0007 
Males 70 .0058 .0025 .0049 -0 -0 -0
    
Females 20 0.0018 -0.0013 0.0078 
Females 50  -0.0027 -0.0016 0.0015 
Females 70 -0.00 -0.0026 57 -0.0018 
The marginal effec nder t of ge
Gender 20 -0.0824 -0.0737 -0.1492 
Gender 50 -0.0812 -0.0530 -0.0812 
Gender 70 -0.0804 -0.0392 -0.0358 
 
Since males report that they drive more per year (see Table 2), we perform 
a sensitivity analysis by including the stated number of kilometers per year
and estimate equations (1) – (3). The results in Tables 1 and 2 in the Ap-
pendix show the same pattern as when not controlling for annual mileage.
Females below the age of 89 have fewer convictions than males when con-
trolling for annual mileage, which is slightly higher compared to not con-
trolling for annual mileage. As before, the probability of fines for traffic 
offences decreases with age. The break-even age is, however, lower com-
pared to not controlling for annual mileage. The probability of being fined 
for speeding increases up to the early 30s and thereafter decreases, as be-
fore. The probability of convictions increases up to the age of 47 for males 
and 57 for females, which is slightly higher for both genders compared to 
not controlling for stated annual mileage. Still
 
 
 males are more likely to 
have a fine or conviction compared to females.  
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4.2 Including more explanatory variables 
In this section we include more explanatory variables. Apart from age and 
gender, we also include annual mileage, age of vehicle and indicator vari-
ables for six vehicle brands. Table 7 contains the results of a probit estima-
tion of equations (4) to (6), where the dependent variables represent differ-
ent traffic violations. More specifically, column A represents at least one 
fine for traffic offences other than speeding, column B represents at least 
one speeding ticket and column C represents at least one conviction.  All 
explanatory variables are illustrated in the table.  
 
Gender has a negative effect on traffic violations suggesting, as before, that 
males are more likely to be fined or convicted for traffic violations com-
pared to females. Older vehicle owners are less likely to have traffic viola-
tions; this suggests that younger vehicle owners are more risky. Further-
more, owners of older vehicles are less likely to get speeding tickets, but 
more likely to have at least one ticket for other traffic offences and at least 
one conviction.  
 
Observed annual driven distance follows the same pattern as vehicle age, 
which suggests that individuals that are convicted for traffic violations or 
fined for traffic offences other than speeding drive in the lower kilometer 
classes, while individuals with speeding tickets state that they drive in some 
of the more exposed kilometer classes.  
 
Moreover, owners of family orientated vehicles (Volvo, Saab, and Volks-
wagen) are less likely to be fined and convicted for traffic violations, while 
owners of status vehicles (BMW, Porsche and Lamborghini) are more 
likely to be fined for speeding and other traffic safety violations.9  
                                                     
9 We performed a sensitivity analysis on the first observation of each indi-
vidual and contract-id and our findings are robust (N = 2 407 918). 
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 Table 7. On-the-spot fines, convictions and explanatory variables. 
 A: Speeding ticket(s) B: Traffic offence(s) C: Conviction(s) 
Gender     -0.0797*** 
(0.0006) 
     -0.0613***    
(0.0004) 
      -0.1095*** 
(0.006) 
Age of vehicle owner     -0.0027*** 
(0.0000) 
    -0.0021***     
(0.0000) 
    -0.0007*** 
(0.0000) 
Age of vehicle     -0.0003*** 
(0.0000) 
      0.0011***    
(0.0000) 
      0.0017*** 
(0.0000) 
Driven distance      0.0099*** 
(0.0003) 
    -0.0068*** 
(0.0002) 
      -0.0087*** 
(0.003) 
Family brands:    
Volvo     -0.0059*** 
(0.0007) 
    -0.0059***     
(0.0004) 
    -0.0017*** 
(0.0006) 
Saab     -0.0076*** 
(0.0009) 
     -0.0147***    
(0.0006) 
    -0.0189*** 
(0.0008) 
Volkswagen     -0.0030*** 
(0.0008) 
     -0.0053***    
0.0006 
    -0.0127*** 
(0.0007) 
Status brands:    
BMW       0.0444*** 
(0.0016) 
     0.0244***     
(0.0012) 
     0.0154*** 
(0.0014) 
Lamborgini       0.3012*** 
(0.0939) 
      0.1146*** 
(0.0631) 
0.0685 
(0.0706) 
Porsche       0.1127*** 
(0.0072) 
     0.0200***     
(0.0042) 
0.0016 
(0.0046) 
Wald  2 : 36392.58 32443.04 34277.73 
Log  
pseudolikelihood 
-3269560.5 -2303908.7 -3035701.8 
Prob> 2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 9 273 278 9 273 278 9 273 278 
Notes: Reported coefficients are marginal effects from probit estimation of 
equations (1)-(3). The dependent variable takes the value one if the indi-
vidual has had at least one on-the-spot fine for traffic offences, at least one 
on-the-spot-fine for traffic offences and at least one conviction for a traffic 
safety violation. Independent variables are age of vehicle owner, vehicle 
age, driven distance (owners stated number of kilometers per year), and 
dummy variables for vehicle brand. *, **, *** represents the 10%, 5% 
and 1% significance level. Cluster robust standard errors are in parenthe-
ses. See main text for more details. 
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5. Conclusions 
This paper contributes to previous findings on traffic violations in the acci-
dent literature by setting out and exploring richer data on traffic violations. 
Our findings confirm previous results in the accident literature in that 
males have a higher share of fines and convictions, compared to females. 
Furthermore, young individuals, especially males, have a higher share of 
fines, compared to older individuals. This result also holds when control-
ling for (stated) annual mileage driven per year. This suggests that males, 
and especially young males, are more inclined to take risk than females. 
Our descriptive analysis shows that a slightly higher share of women make 
claims compared to males. This may be a consequence of the fact that a 
higher share of women has All Risk Insurance compared to men; with 
higher coverage there are incentives to make a claim. This, however, needs 
further empirical (econometrical) analysis to provide robust conclusions. 
 
Our findings also indicate a difference between speeding and other traffic 
violations with respect to annual driven distance and vehicle age: The re-
sults suggest that speeders drive newer vehicles and longer distances per 
year, while individuals with on the spot fines for traffic offences other than 
speeding are more likely to drive shorter distances and older vehicles.  
 
Furthermore, we provide a first attempt at testing the prediction that own-
ers of status vehicles are more likely to speed and engage in risky behavior. 
The results suggests that owners of status vehicle brands are more likely to 
have to pay on-the-spot-fines, especially for speeding, while owners of 
family orientated vehicle brands are less likely to have traffic violations. 
We do not know, however, if risky types purchase status vehicles, or if 
drivers become risky while driving these vehicles. This implies that we can-
not distinguish between adverse selection and moral hazard. An adverse 
selection prediction is that a certain type buys a certain vehicle, while a 
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 moral hazard prediction is that an individual becomes a certain type after 
buying (driving) the vehicle. It is reasonable to expect that individuals be-
have differently in different types of vehicles; an individual may take less 
risk in a family orientated vehicle and more risk in a status vehicle or on a 
motorcycle. One reason is that risk taking is likely dependent on the con-
text, age and family status. This is reflected in the way insurers generally 
treat the insurance contracts: a motorcycle, family vehicle and status vehi-
cle are viewed as different risks, even if the objects are owned by the same 
individual. With the available data, however, it is not possible to observe in 
which vehicle an individual drove when committing the traffic violation, 
which rules out testing the hypothesis that people behave differently in 
different vehicles. 
 
The methodological issues associated with insurer data need further analy-
sis. Besides the debated problems of endogenous and exogenous variables, 
insurer data also challenges methodology. Our primary conclusion is that 
insurer data provides a viable alternative in studying risky behavior. One 
main advantage is that it is possible to study the behavior of both accident-
free and accident-involved individuals. The large numbers of observations 
also provide an opportunity to study different subgroups over several time 
periods and for different vehicles. Insurer data further enables a combina-
tion of accident analysis and economic theory, since it generally contains 
information about payments (premiums) and loss indemnity (costs). This 
implies that it is possible to study risky behavior and financial outcomes 
using the same set of individuals and data source.  
 
 
 23
 
References 
Aarts, L. and I. van Schagen: 2006, ”Driving speed and the risk of road 
crashes: A review”. Accident analysis and prevention 38(2), 215-24. 
 
Angrist, J., D. and J-S. Pischke: 2010, “The credibility revolution in em-
pirical economics: how better research design is taking the con out of 
econometrics”. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 24(2), 3-30. 
 
Arvidsson, S: 2010 “Does private information affect the insurance risk? 
Evidence from the automobile insurance market” Swopec workingpaper 
No. 2010:1. 
 
Bener, A., T. Özkan and T. Lajunen: 2008, ”The driver behavior question-
naire in Arab Gulf countries: United Arab Emirates and Quatar”. Accident 
analysis and prevention 40(4), 1411-1417. 
 
Benfield, J.A., W.J. Szlemko and P.A. Bell: 2006,  “Driver personality and 
anthropomorphic attributions of vehicle personality relate to reported ag-
gressive driving tendencies”. Personality and Individual Differences, 42(2), 
247-258. 
 
Boyer, M., Dionne G. and Vanasse C: 1991 “Infractions au code de la 
sécurité routière, infractions au code criminal et gestion optimale de la 
sécurité routière”. L’Actualité Économique, Revue d’Analyse Èconomique, 
67(3). 
 
24   
 
 Delhomme, P., Dobbeleer, W., S. Forward., A. Simões, G. Adamos, A. 
Areal, J. Chappé, C. Eyssartier, P. Loukopoulos, T. Nathanail, S. Nord-
bakke, H. Peters, R. Phillips, M. Pinto, M-F. Ranucci, G.M. Sardi, 
J.Trigoso, T. Vaa, K. Veisten and E. Walter: 2009 Campaigns and Aware-
ness Raising Strategies in Traffic Safety (CAST). Manual for designing, 
implementing, and evaluating road safety communication campaigns. Bel-
gian Road Safety Institute BIVV, Brussels. 
 
Forward, S: 2006 “The intention to commit driving violations – A qualita-
tive study”.  Transportation Research part F, 9(6), 412-426. 
 
Forward, S: 2008, “Driving violations investigating forms of irrational 
rationality”. Digital comprehensive summaries of Uppsala dissertations 
from the faculty of social sciences 44. Uppsala University. 
 
Groegor, J.A. and I.D. Brown: 1989, “Assessing one's own and others 
driving ability: Influences of sex, age, and experience”. Accident Analysis 
and Prevention 21(2), 155-168.  
 
Janke, M.K: 1991, “Accidents, mileage, and the exaggeration of risk”. 
Accident Analysis and Prevention 23(2-3), 183-188.  
Jonah, B.A: 1997, “Sensation seeking and risky driving: a review and syn-
thesis of the literature”. Accident Analysis and Prevention 29(5), 651-655. 
 
Jonah, B.A.: 1997. “Sensation seeking and risky driving: a review and syn-
thesis of the literature”. Accident Analysis and Prevention 29, 651–665.  
 
 
 
 25
 
Lum, H. and J.A. Reagan: 1995, “Interactive Highway Design Model: 
Accident Predictive Module. Available at: 
http://www.tthrc.gov/pubrds/winter95/p95wil4.htm. Public Roads Maga-
zine. 
 
Massie, D.L., K.L. Campbell and  A.F. Williams: 1994, “Traffic Accident 
involvement rates by driver age and gender”. Accident Analysis and Pre-
vention 27(1), 73-87. 
 
Massie, D.L., P.E. Green and K.L. Campbell: 1997 “Crash involvement 
rates by driver gender and the role of average annual mileage”. Accident 
Analysis and Prevention 29(5), 675-685. 
 
Maycock, G: 1985, “Accident liability and human factors-researching the 
relationship”. Traffic Engineering and Control 26, 330-335. 
 
McKenna, F.P., R.A. Stanier and C. Lewis: 1991, Factors underlying illu-
sory self-assessment of driving skill in males and females. Accident Analysis 
and Prevention, 23(1), 45-52. 
 
Nallet, N, M. Bernard and M. Chiron: 2010, “Self reported road traffic 
violations in France and how they have changed since1983”. Accident 
Analysis and Prevention (in press). 
 
Nilsson, G: 2004, “Traffic Safety Dimensions and the Power Model to 
Describe the Effect of Speed on Safety”.  PhD Thesis, Lund Institute of 
Technology and Society, Traffic Engineering, Lund, Sweden. 
 
26   
 
 Parker, D., J.T, Reason, A.S.R. Manstead and S.G. Stradling: 1995, “Driv-
ing error, driving violations and accident involvement”. Ergonomics 38(5), 
1036-1048. 
 
Peck, R.C. and J. Kuan,: 1983, “A statistical model of individual accident 
risk prediction using driver record, territory and other biographical fac-
tors”. Accident Analysis and Prevention 15(5), 371-393. 
 
Peden, M, R. Scurfield, D. Sleet, D. Mohan, A.A. Hyder and E. Jarwan et 
al (Eds): 2004, “World report on road traffic injury prevention summary”  
World Health Organization. Geneva, Switzerland. Available at: 
http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/publications/road_traffic/w
orld_report/summary_en_rev.pdf 
 
Rumar, K: 1985, “The Role of Perceptual and Cognitive Filters in Ob-
served Behavior” in Human Behavior and Traffic Safety, L. Evans and 
R.C. Schwing, eds. New York: Plenum Press. 
 
Ross, H.L: 1960, “Traffic law violation: a folk crime” Social Problems 
8(3), 231-241.  
 
Statistics Sweden: 2010, “Vanligaste personbilsmärken” [The most com-
mon vehicle make], statistics available at: 
http://www.scb.se/Pages/ProductTables____10516.aspx. 
 
Stradling, S.G., M.L. Meadows and S. Beatty: 2000, “Driving as part of 
your work may damage your health.” In G.B. Crayson (Ed.), Behavioral 
research in road safety IX, Crowthorne: Transport Research Laboratory. 
 
 27
 
Svenson, O: 1981, “Are we all less risky and more skilful than our fellow 
drivers?”.  Acta Psychologica 98, 1253-1269. 
 
Wallén- Warner H. and J. Sandin: 2010, “The intercoder agreement when 
using the Driving Reliability and Error Analysis Method in road traffic 
accident investigations”. Safety Science 48(5), 527-536. 
 
Walton, D: 1999, “Examining the self-enhancement bias: Professional 
truck drivers' perceptions of speed, safety, skill and consideration”. Trans-
portation Research Part F, 2, 91-113. 
 
Weinstein, N. D:1999, “What does it mean to understand a risk? Evaluat-
ing risk Comprehension”. Journal of the National Cancer Institute, Mono-
graph 25, 15-20. 
 
 
Yagil, D: (1998). “Gender and age-related differences in attitudes toward 
traffic laws and traffic violations”. Transportation Research Part F: Traffic 
Psychology and Behaviour 1(2), 123-135. 
 
Åberg, L: 1993, “Drinking and driving: intentions, attitudes and social 
norms of Swedish 
male drivers”. Accident Analysis and Prevention 25(3), 289-296. 
 
Åberg, L. and Rimmö P.A: 1998, “Dimension of aberrant driver behav-
ior”. Ergonomics 41, 39-56. 
 
28   
 
 Appendix A  
Description of the information included in each observation: 
1. Demographic characteristics of the policyholder: individual id-
number, year of birth, gender, home district and self-reported 
number of kilometers driven per year. 
2. Residential area risk classification: the actuarial predicted risk in 
the neighborhood where the policyholder lives. 
3. Car characteristics: vehicle model, brand, construction year, size of 
engine and vehicle-id. 
4. Vehicle risk classification: the actuarial risk classification regarding 
the vehicle. 
5. Private information: The number of on-the-spot fines for speeding 
or other traffic offences of the policyholder during 2004-2007, and 
the number of convictions a policyholder had during 1973-2007. 
6. The type of policy purchased: Traffic Insurance (required if the car 
is in use but not if it is deregistered), Limited Damage Insurance, 
All Risk Insurance (not generally required for new cars since most 
manufacturers provide insurance) and Additional insurance. 
7. Deductible Choice: The only contract providing deductible choice 
(high or low deductible) is All Risk Insurance. 
8. Premium: The price of the insurance policy. 
9. Period covered: From date and to date for each period in the con-
tracts. The number of days with insurance is 1-365 days during 
one period.  
10. Realization of risk: Claims submitted by the policyholder and in-
formation on which insurance covers the claim. It is also possible 
to identify the level of at-fault in the claim (full, partial or no re-
sponsibility).  
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11. Driver information: The insurer’s information on the identity of 
the reported driver in an accident (not necessarily the policy-
holder), age, gender and personal identity number and private in-
formation according to (5). Note that additional drivers are the 
private information of the policyholder, since the premium is not 
dependent on drivers other than the vehicle owner. 
12. Other variables: Household identity, two or more policyholders in 
the same household share the same household-id. 
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 Appendix B 
 
Table 1. Traffic violations, age, gender and stated annual driven  
kilometers. 
 A: Speeding 
ticket(s) 
B: Traffic  
offence(s) 
C: Conviction(s) 
Gender -0.0845*** 
(0.0021) 
-0.0856***  
(0.0015) 
     -0.1916*** 
(0.0020) 
Age  0.0043*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0014***  
 (0.0000) 
     0.0010*** 
(0.0001) 
(Age)2 -0.0001*** 
(1.30e-06) 
-8.70e-06*** 
(9.51e-07) 
     -0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
Age·Gender 0.0001* 
(0.0001) 
    0.0006*** 
(0.0000) 
     0.0022*** 
(0.0001) 
Kilometer class    0.008*** 
(0.0003) 
    0.0106*** 
(0.0002) 
       -0.0173*** 
(0.003) 
Wald 2  33954.17 31537.56 37650.62 
Log pseudolike-
lihood 
-3261373.5 -2312514 -2999989.4 
Prob> 2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 9 273 278 9 273 278 9 273 278 
Notes: The dependent variable takes the value one if the individual has at 
least one speeding ticket, at least one fine for traffic offences or at least one 
conviction for traffic safety violations. The independent variables are gen-
der, age, (age)2 and (age*gender) and kilometer class. Cluster robust stan-
dard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * represent 1, 5 and 10 percent 
significance level respectively.  
 
From Table 1 it is possible to calculate the marginal effects in Table 2: 
 
The marginal effect of age: 
 genderage
age
i
432 2
(.)  
  
The marginal effect of gender:  
age
gender
i
41
(.)  
  
(i = equation (1)-(3)) 
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Table 2 The marginal effects of the interaction terms 
 A Speeding B: Traffic offences C: Convictions 
The marginal effect of age 
Males 20  0.0015 -0.0017 0.0059 
Males 50 -0.0028 -0.0023 -0.0007 
Males 70 -0.0056 -0.0026 -0.0051 
    
Females 20 0.0016 -0.0011 0.0081 
Females 50 -0.0027 -0.0016 0.0015 
Females 70 -0.0055 -0.0020 -0.0030 
The marginal effect of gender 
Gender 20 -0.0826 -0.0732 -0.1486 
Gender 50 -0.0794 -0.0545 -0.0840 
Gender 70 -0.0779 -0.0421 -0.0409 
 
Break even ages: 
 Speeding 
-β2/2β3= -0.004325/2(-0.000071) = 30.46 is the break-even age for males. 
 -(β2+ β4)/2β3=-(0.004325+0.0000947)/2(-0.000071) = 31.12 is the break-
even age for females  
Marginal probit estimates from equation (1) in column A in Table 1. 
 
 Traffic offences:  
β2/2β3=-0.001387/2(-0.0000087)= 79.71 is the break even age for males. 
(β2+ β4)/2β3=(-0.001387+0.0006225)/2(-0.0000087)= 43.94 is the break 
even age for females  
Marginal probit estimates from equation (2) in column B in Table 1. 
 
 Convictions: 
-β2/2β3=-0.010365/2(-0.0001105)= 46.9 is the break-even age for males. 
-(β2+ β4)/2β3=-(0.010365+0.0021527)/2(-0.0001105)= 56.64 is the break-
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 Break even point when females have a higher share of convictions com-
pared to males: 
-β1/β4 =-(-0.1916188)/0.0021527=89.01  
Marginal probit estimates from eq (3), Column C in Table 1. 
 
 
